THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Contracts-Mutuality-Cancellation of Automobile Dealer's Franchise without
Just Cause-[Federal].-In 1937 the Ford Motor Company cancelled without cause
the dealer agreement or "franchise" of the plaintiff, a Wisconsin Ford dealer. The
franchise, last renewed in May 1932, provided that it might be terminated at the will
of either party upon written notice, that cars were to be sold to the dealer at prices
fixed by the company, and that the number of cars to be shipped to the dealer would
rest in the company's discretion. The plaintiff, who had made large capital investments in his business during the twenty-four years he had held the franchise, brought
a tort action to recover damages for the unlawful cancellation of the franchise, basing
his claim upon a 1937 Wisconsin statute.' This statute provided that the Wisconsin
Banking Commission might suspend or revoke an automobile manufacturer's license
to do business within the state where the manufacturer had unfairly cancelled the
franchise of a motor vehicle dealer; it did not, however, specifically give a cause of
action to the aggrieved dealer. The dealer here contended that his franchise was an
invalid contract because it lacked "mutuality," and that, although the statute did
not apply to valid contracts entered into before its passage, it did apply to invalid
agreements. On appeal from a judgment of dismissal, the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held, that the contract between the dealer and the Ford Motor
Company being valid, the Wisconsin statute, presumed to be constitutional, would not
be given a retroactive effect. judgment affirmed. Buggs v. Ford Motor Co.'
Because dealer franchises are drafted by counsel for the automobile manufacturers
the franchises are often so one-sided in favor of these manufacturers as to be held invalid for want of "mutuality."3 The term "lack of mutuality" is employed by the
courts to indicate various insufficiencies in consideration,4 such as uncertainties of
subject matter, promises which are illusory because of excessive discretion in the promisor, and agreements terminable at the will of either party. For example, franchises
have been held to lack mutuality when the number of cars or models to be handled was
not stated,s when the manufacturer had complete discretion with respect to shipments
and the filling of dealers' orders,6 or when either party might cancel the agreement at

IWis. Stat. (1939) § 218.oi(3)(a)17.
2 1"3 F. (2d) 618 (C.C.A. 7th 194o), cert. den. 61 S. Ct. 65 (194o).

3Jordan v. Buick Motor Co., 75 F. (2d) 447 (C.C.A. 7th 1935); Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., Inc., 65 F. (2d) iooi (C.C.A. 4th 1933); Huffman v. Paige-Detroit Motor
Car Co., 262 Fed. 16 (C.C.A. 8th igig). Contra: Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co., i85 N.C.
479,

17 S.E. 706 (1923).

4 See The Necessity for "Mutuality" and the Right of Termination in Sales Agencies, 28
Ill. L. Rev. 8oo (1934); "Mutuality" in Exclusive Sales Agency Agreements, 31 Col. L. Rev.
830 (1931). It has been said that the awarding of an exclusive dealer franchise is sufficient to
constitute legal consideration. 37 Mich. L. Rev. 132 (1938), noting Jay Dreher Corp. v. Delco
Appliance Corp., 93 F. (2d) 275 (C.C.A. 2d 1937). But some automobile dealer franchise cases
do not so hold. Jordan v. Buick Motor Co., 75 F. (2d) 447 (C.C.A. 7th 1935). See in general
Cold Blast Transp. Co. v. Kansas City Bolt & Nut Co., 114 Fed. 77, 8i (C.C.A. 8th z9o2).

s Jordan v. Buick Motor Co., 75 F. (2d) 447 (C.C.A. 7th 1935).
6Huffman v. Paige-Detroit Motor Car Co., 262 Fed. ii6 (C.C.A. 8th 1919); Velie Motor
Car Co. v. Kopmeier Motor Car Co., 194 Fed. 324 (C.C.A.

7 th

1912).
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will.7 On the other hand, courts have found mutuality when provisions in the franchise
make it impossible for the promisor to perform without suffering sufficient detriment
to constitute consideration. Thus, when the number of cars the manufacturer must
ship may be ascertained from the contract,8 or when upon cancelling a dealer's franchise the manufacturer must actively assist the dealer in his enforced liquidation,9
courts have found sufficient detriment to constitute consideration.xo When failure on
the part of either the manufacturer or the dealer to fulfill conditions in the agreement
gives the other power to cancel, the franchise has been held not lacking in mutuality,
and the injured party may recover damages for wrongful cancellation.In its opinion the court considered only the proposition that the company's promise
to sell cars at prices set by itself in a published price list rendered the price to the
dealer sufficiently certain under the peculiar conditions in the automobile industry,
namely, the yearly change of models and prices. 2 However true this may be, the
franchise did not state specifically the number of cars or the models to be handled, a
defect which the same court had previously held to be fatal lack of mutuality.1s Moreover, the court failed to consider the effect of the c ncellation-at-will clause upon the
mutuality of the franchise, although a previous decision in the same circuit had held
that a provision for cancellation by either party for just cause upon thirty days' notice
constituted a lack of mutuality.14
The rights of the parties inter sese do not really seem dependent on a finding of
mutuality sufficient to make the contract binding, except where the agreement contains provisions designed to relieve the dealer of some of the hardships of cancellation.
It does not help a dealer to have his franchise declared a valid contract when the
manufacturer need not fill his orders, can terminate his dealership at will, and need not
help him salvage some of his investment. In the instant case, moreover, holding the
franchise a valid contract precluded statutory punishment of the Ford Motor Company by the Wisconsin Banking Commission and prevented the plaintiff from enforcing any rights he might otherwise have had under the statute in effect when Ford
cancelled.xs
7 Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Automobile Co., 2oi Fed. 499 (C.C.A. 7th 1912);
Velie Motor Car Co. v. Kopmeier Motor Car Co., 194 Fed. 324 (C.C.A. 7th 1gI2); Jordan v.
Buick Motor Co., 75 F. (2d) 447 (C.C.A. 7 th 1935). But see i Williston, Contracts § 1o5
(rev. ed. i936). See in general, i4 Iowa L. Rev. 227 (1929).
s Moon Motor Car Co. of New York v. Moon Motor Car Co., Inc., 29 F. (2d) 3 (C.C.A.
2d 1928).

9Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 3o F. Supp. 917 (N.Y. 1940).
10 Even when the contract was not originally enforceable because it contained a terminationat-will clause, a manufacturer was held liable for breach of contract when he merely let the
stipulated period of duration pass and did not pursue the provision for termination. Ellis
v. Dodge Bros., 246 Fed. 764 (C.C.A. 5th 1917).
- Moon Motor Car Co. of New York v. Moon Motor Car Co., Inc., 29 F. (2d) 3 (C.C.A.
2d 1928).

v. Ford Motor Car Co., 113 F. (2d) 618, 620 (C.C.A. 7th 1940).
Jordan v. Buick Motor Co., 75 F. (2d) 447 (C.C.A. 7th 1935).
'4 Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Automobile Co., 201 Fed. 499 (C.C.A. 7th 1912).
X5It was the plaintiff's theory that even though the Wisconsin statute did not expressly give
a cause of action for damages to a dealer injured by cancellation of his franchise, it was de1Buggs
'3
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In a recent study, 6 the Federal Trade Commission found that the provision common to all dealers' agreements which permits either party to cancel at will upon very
short notice is the ultimate sanction behind other inequitable requirements imposed
upon the dealers, both within and without the franchise.'7 It appears from other
sources that the cancellation-at-will clause has been employed not only to implement
other provisions of the franchise, but also to force dealers to take more new cars than
they wish to handle.,' In consequence, dealers are frequently compelled to give excessive trade-in allowances in order to sell the new cars, and they must sell the turned-in
cars at substantial losses. Dealers may also be forced to make further investments in
their businessesx9 and, when the manufacturer desires, to move their businesses into
less desirable territory.20 The FTC study indicates the detrimental economic effects
to dealers resulting from this situation."1
signed to protect dealers as a class, and hence an aggrieved dealer should be entitled to a civil
remedy at common law. He relied partly on Couch v. Steel, 3 E. & B. 402 (Q.B. 1854), the
Statute of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Ed. I, c. So, and Pollock, Torts i96 (zith ed. 1920) which
states, " . .. The provision of a public remedy without any special means of private compensation is in itself consistent with a person specially aggrieved having an independent right of
action for injury caused by a breach of the statutory duty."
z6 Federal Trade Com'n, Report on Motor Vehicle Industry (1939).
17Some of the requirements usually appearing in franchises are as follows: the dealer must
develop his territory to the satisfaction of the manufacturer; orders are binding on the dealer
but not on the manufacturer; periodically the dealer must submit estimates of his new car
requirements; the dealer must permit inspection of his business and records by the manufacturer; title to all cars remains in the manufacturer, but shipments are at the dealer's risk
from the time of delivery to the carrier; the dealer must pay the list price and actual freight to
his place of business (or a "transportation charge"). Federal Trade Com'n, Report on Motor
Vehicle Industry 139-46 (i939). For a summary of contents of dealers' franchises, see Nat'l
Automobile Dealers Ass'n, Automobile Dealers Franchises for the 1939 Model Year (i939).
is See letters from a Colorado Pontiac dealer and from a New York Ford dealer set out in
Hearings before Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
on H.J. Res. 389, at 93, 95, 75th Cong. 2d and 3 d Sess. (1938).
X9Bushwick-Decatur Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 30 F. Supp. 917 (N.Y. 1940).
20 Ford

Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F. (2d) iooi (C.C.A. 4 th 1933).
21Federal Trade Com'n, Report on Motor Vehicle Industry 891 (i939). In 1937 reporting
dealers sustained a loss on the sale of new and used cars, which totaled eighty-five per cent of
their total business, and made their profit from the remaining fifteen per cent consisting of the
sale of parts, accessories, service, etc. Although there was an average net profit of $97.85 per
new car sold, the average used car was disposed of at a loss of $io2.1i, and the proportion of sales
of new cars to used cars was i to 1.63. On the other hand, the average net profit on accessories
per new car sold was $23.35. Compare the manufacturer's profits per car sold after deduction
of administration and distribution expenses: General Motors, $40 (calculated from Table 40,
p- 536); Chrysler, $48 (calculated from Table 54, p. 602); Ford, loss of $7 (calculated from
Table 67, pp. 653-54). The manufacturers also made substantial profits from the sale of accessories and replacement parts (p. io62): Chrysler, $i,655,ooo of total profits of $221,628,ooo
for the period 1929-1937; General Motors, $117,943,ooo of total profits of $497,662,ooo for the
period 1927-1937; Ford, 49,149,ooo, although a loss of S13,o85,ooo in the sale of cars was

sustained for the period of

1929-1937.
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The FTC has suggested remedial action to remove the more oppressive features of
dealer franchises: "It is recommended that present unfair practices be abated to the
end that dealers have (a) less restriction upon the management of their own enterprises; (b) quota requirements and shipments of cars based upon mutual agreement;
(c) equitable liquidation in the event of contract termination by the manufacturer;
(d) contracts definite as to the mutual rights and obligations of the manufacturers
and the dealers, including specific provision that the contract will be continued for a
definite term unless terminated by breach of reasonable conditions recited therein.122
Voluntary alteration of the dealer franchises by the manufacturers seems the ideal
means of effectuating these policies.23 Beginning with the 1939 franchises, some progress
in this direction has been made in that several manufacturers have undertaken to repurchase some of the new automobiles and parts in the possession of a dealer when the
factory terminates his franchise.24 Further advance toward more equitable liquidation
of other capital outlay and rent commitments seems necessary.
State legislation is probably the most effective method of ensuring a permanent
solution of the dealer-manufacturer problem. The Wisconsin statute may be criticised
for its failure to give a cause of action to a dealer who has been arbitrarily and suddenly deprived of his business. But the sanction of depriving a manufacturer of the right
to do business within the state is a powerful deterrent, and even if applied only to
franchises granted after its passage, it may in time solve this aspect of dealer coercion.
"Federal Trade Com'n, Report on Motor Vehicle Industry Io26 (i939).
'3 Alfred P. Sloan of General Motors in a recent speech to automobile dealers stated that
the cancellation-at-will provision in dealers' franchises requires modification. Address before
the Nat'l Automobile Dealers Ass'n (April 27, 1938).
'4 Ford Revises Dealer Franchises, Business Week, at 23 (Feb. 18, 1939); Nat'l Automobile
Dealers Ass'n, Automobile Dealer Franchises for the 1939 Model Year (1939).
Dealers' organizations have at times appeared to believe that certain other aspects of
dealer-manufacturer relations were more important than the cancellation of dealer franchises.
For example, Claude S. Klugh, manager of the Pennsylvania Automobile Ass'n, in an address
before the Ohio Association at Columbus complained bitterly against "the appointment of
wildcat-cross-selling operators, who are a menace to sound merchandising." 8o Automotive
Industries 147 (Feb. I1I, 1939). On the same theme, see statement of Mr. A. N. Benson, general
manager of the Nat'l Automobile Dealers Ass'n, in the report of the hearing of the Congressional Committee, op. cit. supra note i8, at io.
The attitude of dealers' organizations toward federal regulation of factory-dealer relations
has been negative. The proposed Patman Bill, which would have invited Congressional regulation of the industry, was opposed by 8,147 of the 9,123 dealers who replied out of 40,729 polled
by the Nat'l Automobile Dealers Ass'n. 82 Automotive Industries 357 (April is, i94o). The
bill, because of the opposition of automobile dealers, was not submitted to Congress. In 1940
the FTC drew up rules to govern the automobile industry, but the rules were opposed by a
faction of dealers through Donald Richberg and Charles W. Bishop, Counsel and General
Counsel of the Nat'l Automobile Dealers Ass'n, respectively. Mr. Richberg pointed out that
"Rule 26, aimed at eliminating unlawful conspiracies and combinations to fix or control prices
and create monopolies, was once voted out by the industry. Its inclusion in the present proposed rules makes voluntary compliance beyond hope." 82 Automotive Industries 529 (June r,
194o). The requirement of "cancellation (of franchise) for cause only" was relegated to group
2 of the FTC rules, a section specifically restricted to common consent rules not subject to
federal or judicial enforcement. Business Week, at 30 (March i6, 1940). The FTC rules were
not adopted.
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Several states besides Wisconsin have statutes which afford varying degrees of protection to dealers. Iowa, for example, prohibits an automobile manufacturer or distributor from terminating or threatening to terminate a dealer's franchise without "just,
reasonable and lawful cause" 5 before the date of its expiration. This statute seems
defective, because these franchises usually bear no expiration date. Furthermore, the
statutory sanction against a violator is indirect and ineffective; it takes away his power
to add new dealers to his organization merely in the county in which he wrongfully
terminated a franchise, and for a period of only ninety days.26 Moreover, the dealer is
given no right of action for damages. On the other hand, the Iowa statute does set
forth circumstances to be considered in determining what constitutes a "just and
reasonable cause"' for the termination of a dealer's franchise, a step which many
courts have been unwilling to take, even though this was the criterion selected by the
parties. 28 Although other statutes are silent in regard to the wrongful termination of a
dealer's franchise, they do provide against coercion designed to force the dealer to
handle his installment paper through specified channels. 29
Court action to rectify the present situation might take either or both of two forms.
The first is illustrated in the case of PhiladelphiaStorage Battery Co. v. Mutual Tire
Stores,30 involving the termination by the manufacturer of a jobber's contract which
authorized either party to terminate the contract at any time. The trial court overruled the manufacturer's demurrer to the jobber's claim for damages for termination
of the contract. In sustaining this ruling the upper court stated that the option to
terminate, although unambiguous and valid, could not be exercised in bad faith.3t The
2SIowa Code (i939) § 5039.03.
26 Ibid., § 5o39.o6.

"In considering whether or not a contract ....has been terminated by such manufacturer or distributor without just and reasonable cause therefor, the department shall take
into consideration the circumstances existing at the time of such termination, including the
amount of business transacted by the motor vehicle dealer pursuant to the contract ....
27

the investment necessarily made and the obligation necessarily incurred ....the permanency

of such investment; the reasons for such termination .... and the fact that it is injurious to
the public welfare for the business of a motor vehicle dealer to be disrupted by termination of such contract without just and reasonable cause." Iowa Code (1939) § 5039.06 (9).
28Note 31 infra.
29For example, Minnesota makes coercion by a manufacturer or distributor upon a dealer
with respect to installment paper a misdemeanor. Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 194o) § 397671-3976-85. Cf. Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 194o) § 6302.
30 i6i S.C. 487, 159 S.E. 825 (i931), noted in 45 Harv. L. Rev. 378 (1931).
3'In a case not involving an automobile franchise the contract provided that either party
could terminate it by mailing written notice, making any indebtedness immediately due
and payable. The plaintiff secured sureties for the defendant's debts and then cancelled
the contract for the purpose of making immediate collection. The court held that although
the provision for termination was valid, it might be exercised only in good faith and rendered judgment for the defendants. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Rich, 254 Mich. 82, 235 N.W. 845

(1931). But this decision was distinguished in Bushwick-Decatur Motors v. Ford Motor
Co., 30 F. Supp. 917 (N.Y. 194o), on the ground that, while both contracts provided for termi-

nation by either party upon proper notice, the Ford franchise had the additional qualification
of "at the will of either party" which negatived any assertion that good faith was necessary.
Cf. Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Automobile Co., 2oi Fed. 499 (C.C.A. 7th 1912) ("just

RECENT CASES
case of Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co.32 indicates a second way of protecting dealers.
There an automobile dealer sought damages for breach of a franchise which provided
that either party might cancel upon five days' written notice. The dealer, unwilling
to rely entirely upon this contract in incurring additional expenses, had secured
assurances from the district sales manager that the contract would not be cancelled
and that cars would be shipped only as ordered. The company nevertheless arbitrarily cancelled the contract. The court set aside a nonsuit on the ground that if the
manufacturer made false representations to the dealer which were not carried out and
the latter, with the right to rely on them, did so and suffered injury, he might recover.
It appears that oral promises made by manufacturers are frequently broken in automobile dealer-manufacturer relations.33
Although courts are often persuaded that the automobile dealer, even if unfairly
treated, has contracted for just such treatment,34 greater realism would more adequately recognize the inequality in bargaining power between the parties. Judges
have not hesitated to discern and correct other situations in which one of the contracting parties has used his superior bargaining power to the other's disadvantage. Courts
of equity have zealously protected the mortgagor's equity of redemption from the
mortgagee's disguising stipulations.3s Agreements not to compete have been scrutinized and restricted by court-made limitations as to time, place and reasonableness.36
'Warranties" in insurance policies have been interpreted by the courts to protect the
insured from insurance companies seeking to avoid payment.37
The aggregate of standardized contracts, in which automobile dealer franchises
must be included, has been criticized as the substitution of law privately made by
8
business men for the carefully thought out structure of the common law and statutes.3
cause" held to be too indefinite); Bushwick-Decatur Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 3o F. Supp.
917 (N.Y. i94o) ("just and proper cause" held to be too vague).
32 I85 N.C. 479, 117 S.E. 706 (i923).
33For example, a Texas Nash dealer in the report of the hearing of the Congressional
Committee, op. cit. supra note 18, is quoted as follows at p. 99: "How nice automobile manufacturers can be .... and what flattering promises they will make .... which are never put
into their contract. They .... tell you to .... sign the usual form of printed contract, which
doesn't mean a thing .... but after you have gotten into the business and are established,
they .... forget these promises .... insist you misunderstood them, and then go to the
terms of the printed contract ..... When the dealer tries to go to the courts and enforce
compliance of promises or seek damages for failure to fulfill promises .... the courts sustain
[the manufacturer's contract]. Every dealer of much experience will tell you or anyone frequently he has been told in person and over long-distance telephone by factory representatives
they will do certain things if the dealer will do certain things, and [then do not]." See Ford
Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F. (2d) iooi (C.C.A. 4 th 1933); Bushwick-Decatur
Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 3 c F. Supp. 917 (N.Y. i94o).
34Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., 6s F. (2d) iooi (C.C.A. 4th 1933).
3s 5 Tiffany, Property § 1381 (3 d ed. 1939).
365 Williston, Contracts §§ 1636-39 (rev. ed. 1936).
Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law c. ix (1935).
Prausnitz, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and Continental
Law 142-45 (I937).
37
36
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The dangers of permitting powerful economic groups thus to reinforce their superior
bargaining position9 can be avoided by court action limiting the effectiveness of these
standardized contracts. To protect the automobile dealer, as in the instant case, courts
might construe the termination-at-will and other inequitable provisions strongly
against the manufacturer and imply the requirements of just and reasonable cause and
good faith.
Corporations-Banks and Banking-Extension of Double Liability to Non-Banking
Functions-[New York].-A trust company organized under the New York Bank2
ing Law' was merged, pursuant to provisions of the New York Insurance Law,
with a title and mortgage guarantee company organized under the New York Insurance Law.s The new company carried on the business of each of the merged companies, the title and mortgage guarantee business being conducted in one department
under the supervision of the Superintendent of Insurance, and the banking and
trust business in a separate department, with separate accounts, under the supervision of the Superintendent of Banks. The title and mortgage guarantee business
was the main4 source of income of the company. In 1933 the banking and trust business was terminateds and the claims against that department were paid out of the
common funds of the company. 6 An attempt was made to continue the title and
mortgage guarantee business, but in June 1935, it too was placed in liquidation.
The remaining assets being insufficient to pay all the debts,7 suit was brought by the
Superintendent of Insurance, on behalf of creditors of the title and mortgage department, to enforce the double liability provisions applicable to stockholders of trust
companies.8 The lower court dismissed the suit on the ground that the double liability
provisions rendered the stockholders liable for only such debts as were incurred by the
corporation in its capacity as a banking and trust company. On appeal to the appellate division, held, that a corporation possessing and exercising banking powers is a
39 Ibid., at i44.

x N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1937) c. 2, § go et seq.
2 N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 194o) c. 28, § 441. There is no similar provision in Illinois.
3N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1940)
4

C. 28, § 430 et seq.
Four-fifths of the income of the company before 1933 was derived from its title and

mortgage guarantee business. Brief of Defendants-Respondents Bailey et al., at 3.

' Following a suggestion of the Superintendent of Banks, the directors of the company had
previously voted to operate the two departments as separate corporate units, but the general
condition of the banking system at that time made it impossible to carry out the plan. Brief
of Defendants-Respondents Bailey et al., at 4.
6 Cash was obtained by sale of approximately $4,000,000 of assets to a syndicate of New
York banks. Both the Superintendent of Banks and the Superintendent of Insurance approved the plan. Brief of Defendants-Respondents Bailey et al., at 4.
7 The deficiency amounted to approximately $12,000,000. The value of the assets in

the possession of the Superintendent of Insurance at the time of suit was estimated at not
more than Si,oooooo; the par value of the outstanding stock aggregated $2,000,000. Reply
Brief of Superintendent of Insurance, at 14.
8N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1937) c. 2, § ii3-a.

